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STATE OF UTAH 
DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS' : 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for disparagement of quality 
of goods arising out of two newscasts by the defendant 
commenting editorially upon a product manufactured and 
marketed by the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the Summary 
Judgment in its favor. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in Appellant!s Brief 
is incomplete and wholly inadequate to acquaint the 
court with the essential factual background upon which 
this case must be decided. We, therefore, restate the 
facts. 
In the Fall of 1973, the State of Utah, as 
well as the rest of the country, was confronted with 
a severe and somewhat unexpected energy shortage, partic-
ularly in the sale and availability of refined petroleum 
products. In that connection a variety of measures 
were under consideration both by the government and by 
private industry to cope with and meet the gasoline 
shortage, including reduced speed limits, closing of 
service stations on Sundays and holidays, conversion to 
daylight savings time on a year-round basis, and con-
sideration to rationing of gasoline. At that time 
various means of introducing better gasoline mileage in 
the operation of automobiles were being widely discussed 
and debated. Contemporaneously there was also interest 
in the environmental effects of the waste products of 
gasoline engines on the atmosphere. (R. 3.9-42) 
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In this background, Lynn Packer, a reporter 
for defendant radio station, undertook to make a study 
and to do a series of newscasts on this subject. Two 
newscasts were directed specifically at plaintiff's 
products. (R. 39-42) For the convenience of the court, 
the full text of both newscasts is set forth here. 
Broadcast of November 14, 1973 
"The Utah man who invented !Eccono-Jets' 
today said his device could cut the State's gasoline 
consumption a third if installed on all cars. Howard 
Rock also said his replacement carburetor idle screw 
fights pollution and increases power in addition to 
saving gas. 
"Eccono-Jets are sold in several Utah stores 
for $5.95 a pair. The inventor said they cost 20 cents 
a pair to manufacture - but royalties, packaging, market-
ing, and profits drive the price up. 
"Eccono-Jets replace the idle screws already 
on an engine!s carburetor. The difference: A hole 
through the Eccono-Jet - admitting a stream of air -
supposedly creates a better fuel mixture. 
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[Statement of Inventor, Howard Rock] 
'Well the mileage, of course, will be 
better - on longer trips - the tests 
that we have, have proven that the 
needle will generally get ten percent 
improvement on gas mileage - and as 
high as 17-18 miles to the gallon on 
some of the larger cars driving on 
the highway.? 
"Eccono-Jet advertising says the Utah product 
can add up to six miles per gallon. And the company 
has a stack of customer letters which supports its 
claims. 
"But there are skeptics. A New Hampshire 
auto expert says the idea dates back to 1939. A. J. 
White said the device can slightly increase mileage by 
leaning the fuel mixture. But White said the leaner 
mixture created by the units heTs seen could cause 
burned valves and the hole could admit dust into the 
engine. 
"Inventor Rock says thirty thousand units in 
successful operation prove the skeptics wrong. He 
says he is now developing a new engine that will yield 
60-70 miles per gallon. And to top that the Utahn says 
he!s close to a cure for cancer and the common cold. 
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"A local auto executive said he personally 
thinks such devices are a waste of money. And Dr. 
Grant Winn of the Utah Air Conservation Committee said 
the Eccono-Jets would be unlawful if they alter - for 
the vrorse - a car!s air pollution control equipment. 
"In 1971, a California Government agency 
tested Eccono-Jets and found the unit's decreased 
carbon monoxide emissions but increased hydrocarbon 
and nitrogen oxides emissions." (R. 44-45) 
Broadcast of December 31, 1973 
"A Utah firm which sells what it says are 
economy carburetor needles has sold Nine Hundred 
Thousand Dollars1 worth since October. A spokesman 
for Direct International Buyer's Association says his 
company has put 150 Thousand units into buyers' hands. 
"Tony Kratz, speaking for the Utah company -
says Eccono-Jets are now being sold in many major U.S. 
cities. The units replace a car's carburetor idle 
needles, and are supposed to increase gas economy up 
to six miles per gallon. 
Last month KSL News sent a set to Motor 
Vehicle Research Laboratories in New Hampshire. In 
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his return letter, Director A. J. White said in his 
opinion that the jets do not improve mileage. White 
said, further, that the rules of the U.S. Clean Air 
Act prohibit disturbing a car's existing idle screws. 
And he said replacement idle jets could cause engine 
damage. A spokesman for Eccono-Jets said his product 
was being tested by the New Orleans Police Department, 
and the test was going fvery well.! But in New Orleans, 
Captain Herman Saacks today said he's noticed no gas 
mileage improvement with the jets installed in his 
personal police car. 
"Tony Kratz with Eccono-Jets insists his 
product does work. Kratz says the company's 1974 
Camero has gone from 8-1/2 to 14 miles per gallon with 
Eccono-Jets. As to their legality, Kratz said he's 
heard opinions both ways." (R. 46) 
Examination of these reports, viewed in their 
entirety, reveals that they are not presented as a 
biased criticism of plaintiff's product. Rather, the 
stories are balanced, setting forth both the "pros" and 
the "cons" as to the relative merits of plaintiff's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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product. The inventor of the device is specifically 
quoted as to the claims which were made for it. It 
will be observed that one-half or more of the total 
amount of each newscast quotes comment favorable to 
the plaintiff1s product, and the other half quotes 
comment.adverse to the plaintiff!s product. 
It will be further noted that at no place 
does the commentator express a personal opinion or view 
as to the relative merits of the plaintiff's product. 
He simply sets forth the views of proponents and 
opponents. Not a single statement in either newscast 
has been shown or can be shown to be untrue. 
The gravamen of plaintifffs complaint appears 
to be that the newscasts did not contain all of the 
factual background from which the statements which were 
cited and quoted were distilled. It obviously would 
have been impossible in a short newscast to relate the 
details of all of the examinations, tests and research 
done by all of the persons whose opinions were cited. 
The simple purpose of the newscasts was to acquaint the 
public with the fact that there were conflicting views 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as to the merit of the Eccono-Jets so that the 
listening public could make its own investigation and 
determination as to the value of the devices. 
Following publication of these newscasts, 
plaintiff commenced this action against defendant. 
(R. 1-7) Upon the basis of the undisputed facts the 
trial court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment (R. 88-89) and this appeal followed. (R. 100) 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Although this case has been characterized 
by plaintiff's attorney as an action in defamation, 
it is more properly described as an action for dis-
paragement of quality of goods. Although these two 
torts are very similar and the rules applicable to them 
are very much the same, there are some important differ-
ences. These are spelled out in Restatement of Torts, 
chapter 28, p. 323, as follows: 
"Introductory Note: Liability for dis-
paragement of the property in or the quality 
of land, chattels or intangible things 
differs in several highly important partic-
ulars from the liability for the publication 
of matter which is defamatory to the personal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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reputation of another. In defamation, truth 
is a defense required to be proved by the 
publisher as defendant. In disparagement, 
the person whose property in goods or the 
quality of whose goods has been attacked 
must prove that the disparaging expression 
of opinion is incorrect. Again, in defama-
tion, the publisher who seeks protection 
of a conditional privilege must prove the 
existence of the facts which create it. 
In disparagement, the absence of privilege 
must be proved by the person who seeks to 
recover the financial loss caused by the 
disparagement . . . . The action for dis-
paragement . . . . cannot be used merely 
to vindicate one's title to or the quality 
of one's possessions.n (Emphasis added.) 
See also 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, pp. 479-
481. 
Perhaps the most significant difference, so 
far as the issues of this appeal are concerned, is 
that in an action for defamation, truth is an affirma-
tive defense, and the defendant bears the burden of 
proof, whereas in an action for the disparagement of 
quality of goods, the falsity of a statement is one 
of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of 
action, and the plaintiff has the burden of proof. See 
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 651(c). 
POINT I 
THE STATEMENTS PUBLISHED BY DEFENDANT OF AND CONCERNING 
PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT WERE TRUE AND THEREFORE NOT ACTIONABLE. 
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The rule appears to be well established in 
this country that truth is a complete defense to a civil 
action for defamation or for disparagement of quality 
of goods. The rule is succinctly stated in the 
Restatement of Torts, § 582, as follows: 
"The truth of a defamatory statement 
of fact is a complete defense to an action 
for defamation." 
To the same effect, see 1 Harper and James, The Law of 
Torts, Sections 5.20 and 6.1; Prosser on Torts 4th Ed, 
776, 797; 50 Am.Jur. 2d 676, 682, Libel and Slander, 
§§ 173, 179. 
In the early case of State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 
34, 31 Am. Dec. 217, 221 (1837), the court said: 
l!!If upon a lawful occasion for making 
a publication, he has published the truth, 
and no more, there is no sound principle 
which can make him liable, even if he was 
actuated by express malice. * * * 
•
 !It has been said that it is lawful 
to publish truth from good motives, and 
for justifiable ends. But this rule is 
too narrow. If there is a lawful occasion--
a legal right to make a publication — and 
the matter true, the end is justifiable, 
and that, in such case, must be sufficient.™ 
This language was quoted with approval in Garrison v. 
State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209. See also 
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 
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1975. The rule has been recognized in this state. 
Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Company, 
83 Ut. 31, 27 P.2d 1. 
As noted in our statement of facts, all of 
the statements published by defendant concerning plain-
tiff's- product are shown to be true. As previously 
noted, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the 
falsity of the statements. No effort has been made 
to do this. The record shows without dispute that each 
statement made by the reporter was based upon factual 
information in his file. Even if his sources were not 
accurate, no valid claim can be asserted that he did 
not state their positions correctly. This alone is a 
sufficient defense, and under the authorities above 
cited this alone warrants affirmance of the judgment 
below. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT WERE FAIR COMMENT UPON 
A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND THEREFORE PRIVILEGED. 
It is well established that matters of general 
public interest are subject to fair comment by the news 
media and others, and even if some of the comments are 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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not entirely true, they are not actionable if not made 
maliciously. The social interest of the general public 
in having access to information and to the benefit of 
full and free discussion of issues of public interest 
outweighs any private interest of an individual to be 
free from adverse comment or criticism. Restatement of 
Torts, §§ 594, 598 and 606; Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed. 792. 
As said in 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, 
§ 5.28, p. 456: 
"The principle of 'fair comment' affords 
legal immunity for the honest expression of 
opinion on matters of legitimate public 
interest when based upon a true or privileged 
statement of fact. This principle is of the 
greatest importance to a democratic society 
which enjoys the tradition of free speech." 
See also 50 Am. Jur. 2d 807-808, Libel and 
Slander, § 290: 
"It is firmly established that matters 
of public interest and concern are legitimate 
subjects of fair comment and criticism, not 
only in newspapers, and in radio and tele-
vision broadcasts, but by members of the 
public generally, and such comments and 
criticisms are not actionable, however severe 
in their terms, unless they are made mali-
ciously. I! 
See also op. cit., p. 830, § 308. 
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A prime example of the application of this 
rule is the decision of this court in Williams v. 
Standard-Examiner Publishing Company, 83 Ut. 31, 27 
P.2d 1. In that case the defendant publishing company 
had criticized the plaintiff city commissioner in the 
most scathing terms. He had been charged with criminal 
negligence, manslaughter, criminal carelessness, lying, 
incompetency, deliberate pollution of the water supply, 
ignorance, defiance of valid orders and of being guilty 
of crimes more reprehensible than those for which better 
men were in prison. All of these charges arose out of 
a conclusion by the publisher, based upon apparently 
valid evidence, that a typhoid epidemic resulted from 
permitting contaminated waters to be introduced into 
the municipal water supply. Subsequent investigation 
determined that the waters probably were not the cause 
of the typhoid epidemic. Plaintiff commenced an action 
for defamation and recovered a judgment in the trial 
court which was reversed on appeal. This court said: 
"That appellant and the residents of 
Ogden City had a common interest in the 
threatened typhoid epidemic, in its source, 
and in the prevention of its spread, is not 
open to question. It is equally clear that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appellant and the inhabitants of Ogden 
had a common interest in fixing, if 
possible, the responsibility for the 
outbreak of the disease, and in taking 
such steps as might be necessary to 
check its spread and prevent its re-
currence. Information concerning the 
manner in which plaintiff as city 
commissioner in charge of the water-
works department of the city had been 
and was handling the city culinary 
water supply was likewise a matter of 
common interest to appellant and the 
citizens of Ogden. 36 C.J. 1284, 
§291, and cases there cited; People 
v. Glassman, 12 Utah, 238, 42 P. 956. 
Appellant by informing its readers upon 
such matters was performing a duty which 
falls within that class mentioned in 
the rules as 'of a moral or social 
character of imperfect obligation. f l! 
This court further held that the comments of the 
defendant newspaper were made in good faith without 
actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds 
for believing them to be true, and that the comments 
were reasonable and fair in light of the facts and 
circumstances that existed or appeared to exist at 
the time of the publication. This court also quoted 
with approval from Newell on Slander and Libel 4th Ed., 
as follows: 
nCriticism differs from defamation 
in the following particulars. 
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fl. Criticism deals only with such 
things as invite public attention or call 
for public comment. . . . 
!2. It never attacks the individual, 
but only his work. . . . In every case the 
attack is on a man's acts, or on some thing, 
and not upon the man himself. . . . 
'Every person has a right to publish 
such fair and candid criticism, although 
the author may suffer loss from it. . . . 
Liberty of criticism must be allowed or we 
should neither have purity of taste nor of 
morals. Fair discussion is essentially 
necessary to the truth of history and the 
advancement of science. A publication, 
therefore, which has for its object, not 
to injure the reputation of any individual, 
but to correct misrepresentations of fact, 
to refute sophistical reasoning. . . is not 
actionable. . . . 
11
. . .A fair and bona fide comment 
on a matter of public interest is an excuse 
of what would otherwise be a defamatory 
publication. . . . I!l 
The court also quoted with approval from 36 C.J., as 
follows : 
§285: ,M . . . The right of comment is not 
restricted to a restatement of the naked 
facts. As a general rule it may include 
the right to draw inferences or express 
opinions from facts established. The 
soundness of the inferences or opinions 
is immaterial whether they are right or 
wrong, provided they are made in good 
faith and based upon the truth. . . . !ff 
§287: Ml. . . The criticism may be severe, 
harsh, bitter, or sarcastic. Mere exagger-
ation, ridicule, or even gross exaggeration 
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does not of itself make the comment or 
criticism so unfair as to destroy the 
immunity. It is generally held that such 
comment may be caustic or severe if the 
facts warrant it.!!f 
And finally the court said: 
" • • To say that the writer and 
publisher of the articles here in question 
was motivated by a desire to injure plaintiff 
rather than for the purpose of promoting the 
public weal would be a mere guess. Upon 
this record a finding that the article 
declared on was published with malice in 
fact is without any substantial evidence 
to support it. There is an abundance of 
evidence tending to show that the articles 
were published with a proper motive. 
nWe are of the opinion that the court 
below w • s in error in refusing to grant the 
motion or a nonsuit and the motion for a 
directed verdict.11 (Emphasis added.) 
It will be noted that the criticism published by the 
plaintiff in the Williams case was far more severe, than 
the criticism published of the plaintiff's product here. 
Likewise, there was less basis of truth in the state-
ments published by the defendant in that case than in 
the broadcast by the defendant here. 
A more recent case involving publication of 
defamatory statements concerning a political candidate 
was Demman v. Star Broadcasting Company, 28 Utah 2d 50, 
497 P.2d 1378. In that case the defendant radio station 
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in a talk show permitted statements to be braodcast 
reflecting upon the plaintiff's integrity, his business 
and professional competence, and his personal morals. 
This court affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor 
of the defendant broadcasting company on the grounds 
that the publication was privileged and not shown to 
have been malicious. 
It is clear that the privilege of fair comment 
and criticism is not limited to public officials, 
candidates for public office, celebrities etc., but 
extends to all matters of public interest and concern, 
anything submitted to the public for approval such as 
merchandise, advertisements etc. 50 Am. Jur.2d, Libel 
and Slander §291; Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 828. 
In the case of All Diet Foods Distributors, 
Inc., v. Time, Inc., 56 Misc.2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445, 
defendant published a book showing a picture of plain-
tiff's store front captioned with the words, "Food 
Fads and Frauds.!! A libel action by the plaintiff 
against the defendant was dismissed, the court saying: 
"Certainly the subject matter of the 
article under review if of considerable 
public interest and it cannot be said of the 
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conduct of the defendant with respect to 
motivation that the complaint meets the 
required standards. Certainly the intent 
here was not merely to injure through 
falsehood; rather the motivation was the 
protection of the public in the disclosure 
of a highly important matter affecting the 
public interest. 
"The motion is granted and the com-
plaint is dismissed.!! 
In the case of Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc., 
v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc.2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325, 
defendant published an article critical of food served 
at plaintiff's restaurant. Plaintiff commenced an 
action in libel against the defendant, and summary 
judgment was granted in favor of the defendant, the 
court saying: 
"Even assuming that the article had 
defamatory content, Lollypop, as a public 
facility, must show more than a published 
false statement to recover. It must 
overcome the qualified privilege of fair 
comment which protects criticism of insti-
tutions serving the public. . . . 
"Under recent United State Supreme 
Court pronouncements, comment upon the 
activities of a public figure or private 
individual's involvement in an event of 
public interest is constitutionally pro-
tected under the First Amendment's guaranty 
of free speech and a free press. Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 
1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Certainly, 
a restaurant which serves food to the gen-
eral public is involved in an enterprise 
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of public interest. . . . Preservation of 
freedom to write about restaurants, to 
criticize or compliment, is another form 
of safeguard, and is a vital channel through 
which the publicfs right to know is pro-
tected. . . . 
"Therefore, commentaries in a newspaper 
about a public restaurant's service and food 
even if false are immune from defamation 
liability unless a showing is made that the 
statements were motivated by malice or made 
with wanton disregard. . . . Unless plain-
tiff can show by 'clear and convincing 
proof that the defamatory falsehood was 
published with knowledge that it was false 
or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not', Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc., supra, 403 U.S. at 52, 91 S.Ct. at 
1824, an action for libel will not lie. . . . 
"Since Lollypop does not cite any 
specific grudge or malice that defendants 
may have had in publishing the article, the 
presence or absence of malice or reckless 
disregard must be determined from the con-
text of the article, its tone and quality, 
the manner of its preparation, and the 
content of the specific statements made. . . . 
"To defeat defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, Lollypop must do more 
than rely upon conclusory allegations in 
the complaint. It must show convincing 
evidentiary facts of actual malice. . . . " 
In Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 
F.S. 704, affd. 426 F.2d 862, a magazine article 
critical of plaintiff's hotel was held to be privileged, 
even though some of the statements were not one hundred 
percent true. 
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To the same effect see All Diet Foods 
Distributors, Inc., v. Time, Inc., 290 N.Y.S.2d 445; 
Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 
(D.C. App.), 454 F.2d 1050; and Curtis Publishing Co., 
v. Butts, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 388 U.S. 130. 
Plaintiff relies principally upon three 
cases: Utah Farm Bureau Fed, v. Natl Farmers Union 
Sv. Corp., (10 Cir.), 198 F.2d 20; Carey v. Hearst 
Publications, 19 Wash.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857; and 
Berry v. Moench, 8 Ut.2d 191, 331 P.2d 814. All of 
these cases were decided long before N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, and its 
progeny (more fully discussed under our next point) 
and to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith, 
they are completely invalid. Apart from that, they 
are all significantly different from the case at bar. 
In both U. Farm Bureau and Carey the words published 
were libelous per se. In Berry, the action was not 
really in defamation, but for breach of plaintiff's 
privilege against revealing confidential information 
obtained in the doctor-patient relationship. Nor did 
the case involve a matter of general or public interest. 
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The facts of all these cases are so different from those 
in the case at bar as to make them of no persuasive 
value. 
POINT III 
THE WORDS PUBLISHED BY DEFENDANT ARE PROTECTED FROM 
CIVIL LIABILITY BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In the case of New York Times Company v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, the Supreme 
Court of the United States determined that the First 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the 
press, protect even some untrue statements from civil 
liability. Said the court: 
T,The general proposition that freedom 
of expression upon public questions if 
secured by the First Amendment has long 
been settled by our decisions. The con-
stitutional safeguard, we have said, 
'was fashioned to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired 
by the people1. . . . 
"Thus we consider this case against the 
background of a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleas-
antly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials. . . . 
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!,Authoritative interpretations of the 
First Amendment guarantees have consistently 
refused to recognize an exception for any 
test of truth--whether administered by judges, 
juries, or administrative officials — and 
especially one that puts the burden of 
proving truth on the speaker. . . . 
nThe constitutional protection does not 
turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social 
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are 
offered 1.... 
"As Madison said, 'Some degree of abuse 
is inseparable from the proper use of every-
thing; and in no instance is this more true 
than in that of the press.'" 
This decision was followed and expanded in 
subsequent cases. See Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, the court said: 
". . . The dissemination of the indi-
vidual's opinions on matters of public 
interest is for us, in the historic words 
of the Declaration of Independence, an 
'unalienable right1 that 'governments are 
instituted among men to secure.'. . ." 
i< i t >V *>V 
"Our touchstones are that acceptable 
limitations must neither affect 'the 
impartial distribution of news' and ideas, 
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations 
Board, supra, 301 U.S., at 133, 57 S.Ct., 
at 656, nor because of their history or 
impact constitute a special burden on the 
press, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 
Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 
660, nor deprive our free society of the 
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stimulating benefit of varied ideas because 
their purveyors fear physical or economic 
retribution solely because of what they 
choose to think and publish." 
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 
88 S.Ct. 1323, the court said: 
11
. . . Neither lies nor false communi-
cations serve the ends of the First Amend-
ment, and no one suggests their desirability 
or further proliferation. But to insure 
the ascertainment and publication of the 
truth about public affairs, it is essential 
that the First Amendment protect some 
erroneous publications as well as true 
ones. . . .!! 
See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 
403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 2997, the court said: 
"Although the erroneous statement of 
fact is not worthy of constitutional 
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable 
in free debate. As James Madison pointed 
out in the Report on the Virginia Resolu-
tions of 1798, fSome degree of abuse is 
inseparable from the proper use of every-
thing; and in no instance is this more 
true than that of the press.1 4 Elliot's 
Debates (1876), p.571. And punishment of 
error runs the risk of inducing a cautious 
and restrictive exercise of the constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms of speech 
and press. Our decisions recognize that a 
rule of strict liability that compels a 
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the 
accuracy of his factual assertions may 
lead to intolerable self-censorship. 
Allowing the media to avoid liability only 
by proving the truth of all injurious 
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statements does not accord adequate pro-
tection to First Amendment liberties. . . . 
The First Amendment requires that we pro-
tect some falsehood in order to protect 
speech that matters. 
Under these Supreme Court decisions what 
was once a common law qualified privilege has now been 
determined to be a constitutionally guaranteed right. 
See Prosser on Torts 4th Ed., pp. 819, 822-823, ch. 21, 
§ 118. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE. 
We recognize that summary judgment is a 
drastic remedy, to be sparingly used. However, where, 
as here, there is no real dispute as to the facts, and 
the issues are essentially legal, summary judgment is 
appropriate, sparing both the parties and the court 
unnecessary and burdensome time and expense. See 
Holland v. Columbia Iron Min. Co., 4 Ut.2d 303, 293 P.2d 
700; Dupler v. Yates, 10 Ut.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624; 
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Ut.2d 
329, 353 P.2d 168; Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Ut.2d 
138, 355 P.2d 973, 6 Moorefs Fed. Prac. , § 56.04 p. 2028. 
The remedy of summary judgment has been found 
by many courts to be appropriate in defamation suits 
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In the case of Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc. 
v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc.2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325, the 
court said: 
"In a motion for summary judgment, the 
threshold test of showing malice or reckless 
disregard is vital to the enforcement of 
the consitutional privilege of fair comment. 
Without the demonstrated presence of these 
elements, the publisher should not be bur-
dened with a full trial and its consequent 
inhibitory effect upon future exercise of 
free speech and press. . . ." (Empahsis 
added.) 
In holding that summary judgment was appro-
priate in the Bon Air case the court said: 
"Actual malice is a constitutional 
issue to be decided initially by the trial 
judge vis-a-vis motions for summary judg-
ment and directed verdict. The functions 
of the trial court judge and the jury have 
been explained as follows: 
1
 In my judgment New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan makes actual malice 
a constitutional issue to be decided 
in the first instance by the trial 
judge applying the Times test of 
actual knowledge or reckless dis-
regard of the truth. . . . Unless 
the court finds, on the basis of 
pretrial affidavits, depositions or 
other documentary evidence, that 
the plaintiff can prove actual 
malice in the Times sense, it 
should grant summary judgment for 
the defendant. * * * f 
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flThus it is clear that, where a 
publication is protected by the New York 
Times immunity rule, summary judgment, 
rather than trial on the merits, is a 
proper vehicle for affording constitu-
tional protection in the proper case. 
Judge Tuttle in Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 
supra 406 F.2d at 566, recognized the 
appropriateness of summary judgment: 
!The subject matter of this 
litigation, involving, as it does, 
the very serious and timely question 
of how far the First Amendment 
guarantee of freedom of the press 
may still be impinged upon by 
actions for libel, places some 
cases in a somewhat different 
category. This follows when the 
trial court and this court jointly 
consider that the failure to dismiss 
a libel suit might necessitate long 
and expensive trial proceddings, 
which, if not really warranted, 
would themselves offend the prin-
ciples enunciated in Dombrowski v. 
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 
1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, because of the 
chilling effect of such litigation.! 
"The District of Columbia Circuit 
placed a similar emphasis on the role of 
summary judgments in defamation actions : 
'In the First Amendment area, 
summary procedures are even more 
essential. For the stake here, 
if harassment succeeds, is free 
debate. * * * Unless persons, in-
cluding newspapers, desiring to 
exercise their First Amendment 
rights are assured freedom from 
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the harassment of lawsuits, they 
will tend to become self-censors. 
And to this extent debate on 
public issues * * * will become 
less uninhibited, less robust, 
and less wide-open, for self 
censorship affecting the whole 
public is 'hardly less virulent 
for being privately administered.1 
Smith v. People of State of 
California, 361 U.S. 147, 154, 
80 S.Ct. 215, 219, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 
(1959).' 
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 125 U.S. 
App. D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (1966)." 
And in concluding the court said: 
"Freedom of expression must have 
a necessary breathing space if it is to 
survive. If these statements raise 
factual issues of actual malice, that 
necessary breathing space becomes almost 
meaningless. As has been noted, actual 
malice is a constitutional issue to be 
determined initially by the trial judge 
on motion for summary judgment. We 
are convinced that Bon Air has not 
presented issues of fact from which a 
jury could find that Time published the 
article with actual knowledge of its 
falsity or with a reckless disregard 
as to whether or not it was false.11 
The case of Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 
(8th Cir.) 464 F.2d 986, is of particular interest 
because there, as here, summary judgment was entered 
in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the fact 
that the newsman had claimed a privilege of nondisclosure 
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of his information sources. The plaintiff had sought 
an order compelling disclosure, and the summary judg-
ment was granted without requiring disclosure. The 
following excerpts from the opinion of the court are 
pertinent: -
"The District Court ; . . did not reach 
the merits of the motion to compel. However, 
on the basis of a well-developed record 
consisting of affidavits, depositions, and 
other documentary evidence, it entered 
summary judgment for the defendants on the 
grounds that neither defendant had knowledge 
of falsity, that neither entertained serious 
doubts as to the truth of any statement in 
the article, and that neither acted with 
reckless disregard for truth or falsity. . . 
* * * * 
"Central to the mayor*s appellate 
attack is his contention that he cannot 
possibly meet his burden of proof if the 
reporter is allowed to hide behind anonymous 
news sources. . . . 
•JV VC VC V C 
11
. . . Nevertheless, on the facts of 
this particular case, we believe that in his 
preoccupation with the identity of Life!s 
news sources, the mayor has overlooked the 
central point involved in this appeal: that 
the depositions and other evidentiary materi-
als comprising this record establish, without 
room for substantial argument, facts that 
entitled both defendants to judgment as a 
matter of law, viz., that, quite apart from 
the tactics employed in collecting data for 
the article, the mayor has wholly failed to 
demonstrate with convincing clarity that 
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either defendant acted with knowing or 
reckless disregard of the truth. . . . 
"'When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him.f. . ." 
i< i< i? 
11
. . . The point of principal impor-
tance is that there must be a showing of 
cognizable prejudice before the failure 
to permit examination of anonymous news 
sources can arise to the level of error. 
Mere speculation or conjecture about the 
fruits of such examination simply will 
not suffice. 
lfBut such is not this case. As the 
opinion of the District Court makes clear> 
the record contains substantial evidence 
indicating that it was over a period of 
many months that Life's reporter care-
fully collected and documented the data 
on the basis of which the article was 
written and published. . . . 
11
. . . Where, as here, the published 
materials, objectively considered in the 
light of all the evidence, must be taken 
as having been published in good faith, 
without actual malice and on the basis 
of very careful verification efforts, 
that is, they were published in good 
faith without regard to the identity of 
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the news sources, there is no rule of 
law or policy consideration of which 
we are aware that counsels compulsory 
revelation of news sources. Neither 
is there any evidence by which a jury 
could reasonably find liability under 
the constitutionally required instruc-
tions. When these factors conjoin, 
the proper disposition is to grant the 
defense motion for summary judgment. 
The judgment of the District Court 
must therefore be affirmed.11 
CONCLUSION 
Basic to the fundamental freedoms enjoyed by 
the citizens of this state and nation are the freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press. These guarantee 
"uninhibited, robust and wide-openn debate on issues of 
public interest and concern. Those who appeal to the 
public market for patronage must be subjected the 
scrutiny of adverse comment and criticism. The media 
should not be hampered in the exercise of their consti-
tutionally guaranteed freedoms by fear of litigation 
which, even though not meritorious may be ruinously 
expensive to defend, particularly if there is full-scale 
trial of every case. Where as here, there is no showing 
of falsity, and no showing of malice, and where the 
publication amounts to nothing more than a fair comment 
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upon a matter of public interest, summary judgment 
should be granted as was done in this case. We respect-
fully submit that the judgment below should be affirmed. 
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